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The "loans for shares" scheme of 1995-6—in which a handful of well-connected businessmen bought
stakes in major Russian companies—is widely considered a scandal that slowed subsequent Russian
economic growth. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program. In light of evidence available
today, I concur with the critics that the scheme’s execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other
regards the conventional wisdom was wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the
market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain
a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called
"oligarchs," but Soviet era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms
performed far better than comparable state enterprises and companies sold to incumbent managers,
and helped fuel Russia’s rapid growth after 1999.
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On November 3, 1995, in the remote Siberian town of Surgut, an auction took place for the right 
to lend the cash-strapped Russian government tens of millions of dollars. Collateral for the loan 
was to be a 40 percent stake in the country’s fifth largest oil company, Surgutneftegaz. Two 
bidders made it into the auction room; a third had been barred because of problems with the 
firm’s paperwork. Had any others planned to fly out from Moscow to take part, they would have 
had trouble: the local airport mysteriously chose to close that day. When, late in the evening, the 
participants emerged, the winner turned out to be Surgutneftegaz’s own pension fund. 
Thus began what came to be known as “loans for shares.” This program, under which 
stakes in 12 companies were eventually sold to selected private investors, quickly took on mythic 
proportions in writing about Russia’s economic transformation. Widely condemned, it became a 
symbol of all the errors and sins—real or alleged—of Yeltsin’s reformers. The program was a 
“Faustian bargain,” wrote one journalist, a “fiendishly complicated scheme,” in which the liberal 
ministers sold their souls to a cabal of unscrupulous tycoons, who—switching metaphors—
quickly metamorphosed into a “Frankenstein’s monster.” It “deformed” the economy, 
“impoverished” the population, and laid “a corrupt, inegalitarian foundation for everything that 
came after it” (Freeland 2000, pp.22-3, 169-89). Under loans for shares, contended one Nobel-
prize-winning economist, the country’s best firms were stripped of their assets. “The enterprises 
were left on the verge of bankruptcy, while the oligarchs’ bank accounts were enriched” (Stiglitz 
2002, p.160).    
  Given the resonance the program had—and continues to have even 15 years later—it is 
worth revisiting the details to see how well the popular image fits the facts. Given what we now 2 
 
know, were the fears of the program’s critics justified? Do the interpretations offered at the time 
fit the evidence now available?  
  The facts of the scheme were actually quite simple. The government gave—usually 
minority—tranches of shares in 12 large, state-owned corporations to certain businessmen to 
manage in trust, in return for loans to the federal budget totaling about $800 million. Besides 
Surgutneftegaz, the companies included the oil corporations LUKoil, Yukos, Sidanko, and 
Sibneft as well as the nickel producer Norilsk Nickel and the Mechel and Novolipetsk Steel 
Works. If the government did not repay the loans by September 1996, the creditors were then 
allowed to auction off the tranches and keep 30 percent of any profit. In the event, the 
government did not repay the loans, and the creditors sold the stakes, usually to themselves. 
Competition was kept to a minimum through careful rigging of the auctions.  
  In this paper, I attempt to answer five questions. How large were the stakes involved? 
Did the auction winners underpay, and if so, by how much? Why did the government agree to the 
program? How was it implemented? And what consequences did it have for the companies 
involved, for the country’s rate of growth, and for economic inequality? I find that the critics 
were correct that the scheme’s execution appeared corrupt. It is also true that in the three years 
after the auctions, the winners did their utmost to squeeze out minority shareholders in ways fair 
and foul.  
  Beyond that, however, the conventional wisdom appears wrong on numerous points. I 
find that: the program’s scale was far more modest than suggested at the time; the pricing was, in 
most cases, in line with international practice; the biggest winners were not the so-called 
“oligarchs,” but entrenched Soviet era managers; subsequent performance of the main loans for 
shares firms was far better than that of similar companies that remained state owned; and the 
dramatic output increases of the oligarch firms helped propel Russia’s impressive growth after 
1999. In short, the way implementation of the scheme was handed over to interested parties was a 3 
 
scandal, but there is little evidence that the program had most of the negative consequences 
attributed to it. On the contrary, it helped catalyze Russia’s eventual rebound.
1  
 
1   How large were the stakes involved?  
Journalists characterized the 12 companies whose shares were pledged as the “crown jewels” and 
“behemoths” of the Russian economy (e.g. Freeland 2000, p.170). From the coverage, one could 
easily get the impression that a large slice of Russia’s industrial base changed hands in the 
operation. In fact, although some of the companies were significant ones, the scale was rather 
more modest.  
The original plan had foreseen inclusion of 43 enterprises (Kokh 1998, p.108). But the 
managers of most of these managed to arrange the exclusion of their companies, bringing the total 
down to 16. Then, four of these failed to attract any bids. Of the 12 companies for which there 
were bids, most were already trading on Moscow’s stock markets as of late 1995. If one values 
the shares pledged by the government at their market prices when the program began, their total 
value came to about $1.5-1.9 billion, or 8-10 percent of the total capitalization of the Russian 
stock market at that time.
2 For comparison, an estimated $2.5 billion worth of stock in just the 
company Gazprom was given away by the government in return for privatization vouchers 
around this time (see below).  
                                                 
1 I draw at various points on an earlier, brief analysis of loans for shares in Shleifer and Treisman (2005, 
pp.161-2). For an authoritative account of the ideas behind Russian privatization and how it was 
implemented in practice, see Boycko et al. (1995).  
 
2 The figure is only approximate, since share prices were not available for two of the 12 companies—
Sidanko, and the much smaller Nafta-Moskva. The market capitalizations of the stakes in the other 10 
companies as of October 2, 1995, as recorded in the database of the magazine Ekspert, sum to $1.45 billion 
(http://raexpert.ru/ratings/expert400/1995/capitalization/), or 7.6 percent of the total market capitalization 
of $19 billion (Russian Economic Trends, 1996, 5, 2, p.114). Supposing that Sidanko would have been 
valued similarly to the oil companies Yukos, Sibneft, or Surgutneftegaz, the 51 percent stake in it would 
most likely have had a market value of somewhere  between $200 million and $400 million. The market 
value of a 15 percent stake in Nafta-Moskva, an oil products trading company, would have been much 
lower. It is very unlikely that the total would have exceeded 10 percent of the market.  
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  Of course, the market was tiny in 1995. If one values the companies at their capitalization 
ten years later in 2005—after the new owners had restructured the companies and rising 
commodity prices had driven share prices much higher—the stakes would constitute a similarly 
small fraction of the market. At that point, the stakes pledged would total about seven percent of 
the market’s capitalization (or about 9.5 percent if one uses the value of Yukos in 2003, before 
the government began dismantling it).
3 The total revenues of the 12 companies in 1995 amounted 
to less than nine percent of Russian GDP.
4 By itself, the national electricity company EES had 
higher revenues than all 12 companies put together. In short, the program involved several major 
firms, but the stakes transferred amounted to only a relatively small portion of the economy.  
 
2   Did the winners underpay, and if so by how much?  
There are various ways one might assess the value of the stakes. One method would be to 
compare the Russian companies involved to others with similar assets in other parts of the world. 
Journalists looked at the valuations of Western oil companies per barrel of oil reserves and 
concluded that the Russian oil companies were grossly underpriced.  
  However, such comparisons are extremely misleading. The value of a company is not 
simply the sum of its assets. One must also factor in its liabilities and the risks. Many of the 
corporations whose shares were pledged had staggering debts, for which a new owner would 
become responsible. One subsidiary of Sibneft owed $2 billion (Sborov 1996). According to 
                                                 
3 Calculated from the Ekspert database, www.expert.ru/ratings/. I take total market capitalization as $548.6 
billion, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In 2005, figures are available for Sidanko, 
but not for Nafta-Moskva and the North-West shipping Company. These were small, and would not change 
the result much.  
 
4 Figures from the Ekspert database and Sibneft’s 1996 financial statement. Revenues for the shipping 
companies and Nafta Moskva were not available, but since they did not make it onto Ekspert’s list of the 
200 companies with the highest revenues, their revenues must have been lower than those of the 200
th firm 
on the list. Supposing each of these four firms had revenues equal to those of the 200
th firm, I arrive at a 
total of 8.97 percent of GDP. Of course, GDP measures value added, whereas the firms’ revenues do not 
take into account costs, so the nine percent figure exaggerates their contribution to GDP.  
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Khodorkovsky, when he bought into Yukos the company’s debts came to $3 billion (Pirani 2000). 
Potanin said that Norilsk Nickel was losing $800 million a year, and that its debts totaled $2 
billion (Brady 2000, p.222). Even if they were exaggerating, the liabilities were known to be 
enormous and rising.  
  As for the risks, these piled up, layer upon layer. First, there was political risk. In late 
1995, the Communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, was widely expected to win the June 1996 
presidential election and to annul the loans for shares deals, most likely without compensation. 
For this reason, most foreign investors would not touch them. Berezovsky lobbied all his contacts 
in the West—at Mercedes, Daewoo, and in investment banking in New York—looking for 
partners to help bid for Sibneft. He found no takers. When he tried to persuade George Soros to 
put in $10-15 million, the veteran investor advised him instead to sell out and flee Russia before a 
Yeltsin defeat. “This package is worth nothing,” Soros reportedly told Berezovsky’s associate 
Alex Goldfarb. “I’ll bet you a hundred to one that the Communists will win and cancel all these 
auctions. And my advice to Boris is this: he should not do it either. He is putting into this all he 
has got, and he will lose it all.”
5 Khodorkovsky also said he tried to find partners in the West, but 
the bankers he approached “looked at us as if we were crazy.”
6 
  Even if Zyuganov and the Communists did not win power, to restructure the companies 
and make them profitable, the winners of the auctions would have to fight punishing battles 
against the entrenched, Soviet-era managers, with their contacts in local law enforcement and 
sometimes organized crime. In 1995, the main oil producing unit of Yukos, Yuganskneftegaz, 
was selling its output through a network of Chechen gangsters (Panyushkin 2006, pp.82-92). 
Most of the oligarchs survived assassination attempts. There was no guarantee that the new 
                                                 
5 This is Goldfarb’s account (see Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, p.56). In his book Open Society: 
Reforming Global Capitalism, Soros writes that he abstained from investing in Russia at this time because 
“I did not like what I saw,” and recalls telling Berezovsky in January 1996 that if Zyuganov was elected, 
Berezovsky “would hang from a lamppost” (Soros 2000, p.243).  
 
6 Quoted in Freeland (2000, p.184).  
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stakeholders would prevail in the struggle for control. Meanwhile, the incumbent managers would 
be stripping value from the firm, selling its assets to keep them from the new investors. 
Simultaneously, the winners might face “greenmail” from minority shareholders, who would 
block restructuring in the hope of being bought out at an exorbitant price.
7   
  A third layer of risk resulted from the dramatic fluctuations in the prices of the 
commodities that the pledged enterprises produced. Oil and nickel prices had plunged in the 
1990s. They would fall still further in 1998. Not surprisingly, profits at these companies and their 
share prices varied with the prices of their main products. At the same time, even a non-
Communist government would be tempted to solve its budget problems by increasing taxation of 
the oil and minerals sectors. Thus, it was not clear how high after-tax profits would be even if 
commodity prices recovered.  
  To summarize, for these companies to become profitable with high share prices, the 
Communists would have to lose the 1996 election, mineral prices would have to recover, the 
government would have to refrain from punitive taxation, and the new outside investors would 
have to succeed in forcing out entrenched managers and organized crime, overcoming 
“greenmail” from minority shareholders, and restructuring the companies. Given the low 
probability that all these things would come to pass, it is not surprising that the stakes sold for 
less than they might have been worth in a world with less risk. Nor is it surprising that in a 
number of cases, stakes in similar companies that the government tried to sell in these years failed 
to attract any buyers at all. In 1997, auctions of stakes in Tyumen Oil, Eastern Oil, Slavneft, 
LUKoil, and Rosneft all had to be postponed or cancelled for lack of bids.
8  
                                                 
7 Khodorkovsky claimed to be a victim of such greenmail in 1999 when the investor Kenneth Dart, who 
owned about 12 percent of three Yukos subsidiaries, sought to block restructuring unless he was bought out 
at a premium. Yukos engaged in various tricks to reduce Dart’s stake, and eventually settled with him. 
See Hoffman (1999) and Landers (2000). 
 
8 Russian Economic Trends, 1998, 1, p.90. 
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  Another way to value companies is by reference to their market value at some point in the 
future. Thus, observers often claimed that the loans for shares stakes were sold very cheaply 
because the companies’ capitalizations later increased. Reporters expressed outrage that in late 
1997 some of the loans for shares companies were valued at many times their capitalization in 
late 1995 when the program started (e.g. Klebnikov 2000, p.207). Again, this ignores the risks 
involved. In fact, Russian markets crashed soon after the high 1997 valuations. By 1998 and 
1999, the capitalizations of some of these companies had fallen far below their values when the 
loan auctions took place.
9  
  Indeed, any investor who had been willing to take risks similar to those the oligarchs took 
and had guessed as well as they did could have become comparably rich. The stocks of most 
publicly traded Russian companies appreciated astronomically in the years after 2000. Anyone 
who invested the same amount and bought a basket of Russian stocks on the market in 1998 
would have been a billionaire ten years later.
10 Most Western investors in 1998 were fleeing the 
Russian market. Had the oligarchs been as faint-hearted and sold out at that point, they would 
have lost millions of dollars from loans for shares. If one maintains that the oligarchs underpaid 
in 1995-6, then one must apparently also hold that those private investors who bought shares in 
the same companies on the open market in 1998 for even less than the oligarchs had paid were 
guilty of even greater underpayment.  
                                                 
9 According to the Ekspert database, www.expert.ru/ratings/, at the end of 1999 the capitalization of Yukos 
was $235 million (compared to $646 million in October 1995); that of Norilsk Nickel was $472 million 
(compared to $694 million in October 1995); that of LUKoil was $5.4 billion (compared to $7.7 billion in 
1995). The lower valuations could reflect mismanagement by the winning bidders. However, it was most 
likely caused in large part by lower commodity prices and a fall in international investors’ interest in 
emerging markets. 
  
10 Had an investor spent $150 million on a basket of stocks tracking the RTS index at the bottom of the 
market in September 1998, his holdings would have been worth $8.4 billion in May 2008; if he had made 
the same investment in November 1995, they would have been worth $5.2 billion in May 2008. Even if he 
was tricked out of some of the value by dilution of shares or other sharp dealings, he would probably still 
be a billionaire.  
 8 
 
  The standard way to value firms is to look at what others were willing to pay for shares in 
them—that is, their share price and market capitalization—at a given point in time. One assumes 
that the average buyer takes into account the company’s debt, the risks involved, and other 
relevant considerations. If one calculates the value of the loans for shares stakes based on the 








































Won by “oligarchs”              
   Yukos    45  159  159.8  290.5  298.4  45  46 
   Sibneft  51  100.1  107.3  128.1  230.0  16  53 
   Sidanko  51  130  130  n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  n.i. 
   Norilsk Nickel  38  170.1  230.2  263.6  321.1  13  28 
   Novolipetsk Metal  14.84  31  31  31.6  33.4  2  7 
   Murmansk Shipping  49  4.125  n.i.  10.9  n.i.  n.i.  n.i. 
   Northwest Shipping  25.5  6.05  n.i.  8.4  n.i.  n.i.  n.i. 
Won by company 
management—“red 
directors”              
   LUKoil  5  35.01  41.02  383.0  339.7  89  88 
   Surgutneftegaz  40  88.3
a  88.3  288.3  795.2  69  89 
   Nafta Moskva  15  20.01  n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  n.i.  n.i. 
   Novorossiysk     
   Shipping  45  22.65  n.i.  38.1  40.1  n.i.  n.i. 
Won by other              
   Mechel  15  13.3  n.i.  2.5  n.i.  n.i.  n.i. 







  On this basis, it appears that the winners received a discount relative to the current share 
price of about 13 percent for the stake in Norilsk Nickel, 16 percent for that in Sibneft, 45 percent 
for that in Yukos, 69 percent for that in Surgutneftegaz, and 89 percent for that in LUKoil. If we 
value the companies instead at their market capitalization in August-September 1996 (the 
deadline for the government to repay the loans and reclaim the shares) the discount would be 9 
 
somewhat higher in most of these cases: 28 percent for Norilsk Nickel, 46 percent for Yukos, 53 
percent for Sibneft, 88 percent for LUKoil, and 89 percent for Surgutneftegaz.
11 For these five 
companies, based on the 1995 capitalizations, the total discount received came to about $727 
million; using 1996 valuations, it was $1.36 billion.  
  If one accepts these rough estimates, they suggest several things. First, by this metric, the 
winners did pay less than the market value of the shares. Again, however, some context is useful. 
In fact, some discount is virtually universal in IPOs or major share issues by state-owned 
companies, and the discount tends to be large in developing and middle income countries. A 
discount is considered necessary to ensure the placement of large blocs of shares simultaneously. 
Laurin et al. studied privatizations in 10 emerging markets (other than Russia) and found that on 
average state companies that were privatizing underpriced their share offerings by about 34 
percent relative to the stock price after the first day (Laurin et al. 2004, p.415). This was exactly 
the same average discount on share issue privatizations estimated by Jones et al. from data on 630 
share offerings in both developed and emerging markets (Jones et al. 1999; Megginson 2005, 
p.212). Ariff et al. examined 29 privatizations in Malaysia and Singapore and found that on 
average the Malaysian shares were sold at a 57 percent discount and the Singapore shares at a 29 
percent discount.
12 In this light, most of the discounts for the Russian loans for shares companies 
do not look completely out of line.   
  Second, Table 1 suggests that the biggest winners from the program were not the so-
called oligarchs—outside investors who raised their seed capital in trade and banking—but the 
“red directors”—insiders who used the program to consolidate control over companies they 
                                                 
11 In addition, some of the winning bidders were required to make large investments in the companies, 
which I do not take into account in calculating the discounts. Of course, they, as the shareholders, would 
benefit from the value created by such investments. In some cases, it was reported that the investments 
were not made.  
 
12 That is, one day after the share issues, the Malaysian shares were worth 134 percent more and the 
Singapore shares were worth 42 percent more (Ariff et al. 2007).   
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already managed. However one estimates the discounts, by far the largest went to the managers of 
LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz, who bought shares in their own corporations—in Surgutneftegaz’s 
case, using money from the firm’s own pension fund. Valued at October 1995 share prices, the 
winners of the stakes in LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz got a total discount of $542 million; on their 
stakes in Yukos, Sibneft, and Norilsk Nickel, Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky, and Potanin received a 
total discount of $185 million.  
  For comparison, consider again the privatization of Gazprom, the most valuable 
corporation controlled by red directors. Of the 58.9 percent of the company’s shares given away 
for privatization vouchers in the early 1990s, 10 percent were initially transferred to the company 
itself in return for vouchers and later sold at very low prices to affiliated firms “owned largely by 
relatives and associates of top Gazprom executives.”
13 Another 15 percent were distributed to the 
company’s workers. Another 33.9 percent were sold at voucher auctions run by the company in 
different regions of Russia. In October 1995 as the loans for shares auctions got underway, 
Gazprom’s market capitalization was $4.3 billion.
14 Thus, value worth $2.5 billion was given 
away for vouchers, at least $1 billion of this to the management and workers. Next to this, the 
roughly $185 million discount to the three oligarchs looks somewhat less dramatic.  
 
3   How was the program implemented? 
The way the auctions were conducted—both those for the right to lend and those for the shares—
gave the impression of blatant cronyism (Hoffman 2003, pp.312-20). The winners often turned 
out to be front companies for the auctioneers themselves. Winning bids came in just marginally 
above the starting price. In some cases, arbitrary conditions were imposed that would be hard for 
any but the designated winner to fulfill. Surgutneftegaz held its auction in a remote Siberian 
                                                 
13 Novie Izvestia, 2 September 1999, pp.1-2. For more details on the voucher sales, see Shepherd (1993).  
 
14 Ekspert database on capitalization, http://raexpert.ru/ratings/expert400/1995/capitalization/. 
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location and allegedly arranged the closure of the local airport. Some would-be participants were 
disqualified on what appeared to be technicalities or on grounds that might equally well have 
applied to the winners.
15 More than once, a disqualified investor dramatically tore open his 
envelope to reveal a bid for tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars more than the winner had 
offered (Kokh 1998, pp.121-6). The abuses were no worse than those occurring in thousands of 
companies around the country that were being privatized by insiders to themselves or their 
associates. But they were more public. For those eager to discredit privatization, the seamy 
spectacle was a gift. 
 
4   Why did the government agree to the scheme?  
The idea for loans for shares, by all accounts, came from the banker Vladimir Potanin. Why did 
privatization chief Anatoli Chubais and then the rest of the government agree? Those involved 
mention several interconnected reasons. First, the authorities were desperate to raise money. 
Large revenues from privatization had been factored into the budget, and were vital to finance the 
deficit and prevent a relapse into hyperinflation, which was finally subsiding in 1995. But the 
Duma had imposed a ban on privatizing stakes in oil companies, and privatization had all but 
ground to a halt.
16 As of September 1995, privatization had generated only 162 billion rubles 
(about $36 million) of the 8.7 trillion rubles budgeted (about $1.9 billion) (Brady 2000, p.135). 
Without the roughly $800 million provided by the banks in loans for shares, the government 
probably could not have sustained its victory over inflation.  
  Second, the privatizers were eager to inject competent management into the major 
industrial companies and begin restructuring. The old managers were diverting assets, running up 
                                                 
15 Some of the apparent technicalities may not have been so technical; there were genuine questions about 
whether some of the bidders actually had the cash to pay the amounts they said they wanted to bid.  
 
16 For the ban, see the Federal Budget Law, in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 13, 1995, Article 12.  
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billion dollar debts, and not paying their workers. Dislodging the more corrupt and incompetent 
red directors would get much harder if, as expected, the Communists increased their control over 
parliament in the December 1995 election. These enterprises would remain stuck in the state 
sector for years, unreformed, inefficient, and holding back any recovery rather than fueling it. 
Loans for shares was a way to circumvent the Duma’s ban on privatizing oil companies and get 
private entrepreneurs into management positions. This was the argument that Chubais 
emphasized in discussions with international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.
17   
  Third, the program had an explicitly political subtext. With the presidential election 
around the corner, winning the support of the new private business elite was thought crucial to 
Yeltsin’s reelection. The two-stage set-up of the program—with the loans made before the 
election, but the auction of the shares only after it—gave the participants a strong interest in 
preventing a Zyuganov victory. Although critical of how the auctions were conducted, Yegor 
Gaidar, the former prime minister, agreed that without the scheme “Zyuganov’s chances of 
winning the elections would have been substantially better, and maybe he would have been 
unbeatable.”
18 
  Although co-opting the new private business sector does seem to have been part of the 
motivation, this raises further puzzles. Even without loans for shares, the tycoons would surely 
have supported Yeltsin; they had plenty of other reasons to fear the restoration of communism. In 
the event, even those who lost out in loans for shares rallied to Yeltsin’s side. Vladimir Gusinsky 
did not win anything, but he nevertheless pressed his NTV television network into service for the 
campaign. Moreover, if David Hoffman of The Washington Post is correct that the oligarchs 
actually made net profits from the election campaign through special deals with low-cost 
                                                 
17 Personal communication from Martin Gilman, IMF representative in Russia at that time, June 23, 2009. 
 
18 Quoted in Hoffman (2003, pp.312-3). 
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government bonds, then additional financial sweeteners were hardly needed to win their 
support.
19  
  Even if such electoral considerations motivated the program’s introduction, they do not 
explain why the government did not raise the money to repay the loans in August 1996 after 
Yeltsin had been reelected and the danger of Communist revanche had passed. Admittedly, the 
government was extremely short of cash. But had it raised the eight hundred million dollars to 
repay the loans, it could have earned even more by reselling the stakes to the highest bidder. The 
market price of some of these had risen considerably since the previous year. Instead, Potanin, 
one of the winners, was brought into the government.  
Until Chubais or another insider publishes a frank memoir, we will not know the answer 
to this. Critics of the government often imply that the reason was straightforward corruption on 
the part of individuals involved. But no concrete allegation of a payoff has surfaced. This is 
somewhat surprising given that Gusinsky and Berezovsky fell out with the government reformers 
in 1997 over the sale of a stake in the communications monopoly Svyazinvest to Potanin and used 
their press holdings to deluge their adversaries with mud.
20 At that time, the two media magnates 
publicized the fact that advances of $90,000 had been paid to five members of the privatization 
team for chapters they were to write in a book on privatization.
21 However, these honoraria were 
alleged to be hidden payoffs related to the Svyazinvest deal, not to the original loans for shares 
transactions. Ironically, what caused the oligarchs’ ire over the Svyazinvest deal was that it had 
                                                 
19 See Hoffman (2003, pp.348-51). On the other hand, in April 1996, after the head of the privatization 
agency, Aleksandr Kazakov, and prime minister Chernomyrdin discussed out loud the possibility of paying 
back the loans rather than letting the banks sell the shares, the magnates did begin an odd flirtation with 
Zyuganov, issuing an appeal to all sides to cooperate and meeting with the Communist leader to discuss 
such cooperation (“Kazakov wants oil stocks back,” The Moscow Times, April 10, 1996; Natalia 
Gurushina, “Government Discusses Privatization,” OMRI Daily Digest, No. 78, 19 April, 1996). Whether 
they were trying to scare the Kremlin by this is not clear.  
 
20 Gusinsky had not participated in loans for shares, and so could have accused the government of 
corruption in this without incriminating himself. 
 
21 Such honoraria were perfectly legal, but seemed large. The recipients said they were donating 95 percent 
of the amount to charity. The book was published in 1999.  
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been completely honest: the price was very high, and there was no rigging of the bids in 
Gusinsky’s favor.
22  
My guess is that in the summer of 1996, the key players were simply too preoccupied 
with getting Yeltsin heart surgery and keeping him alive to contemplate reversing the loans for 
shares deals. They only had a couple of months between Yeltsin’s election victory and the 
deadline for repaying the loans. The battle with the loans-for-shares winners would have been 
bruising, as demonstrated by the clashes later over Svyazinvest. With the president extremely 
sick, the reformers may have simply thought such a course too dangerous.  
 
5   How did the change in ownership affect the companies’ performance?  
Did the new owners depress investment and output growth and strip their corporations’ assets, as 
the critics claimed? In fact, the oligarch-controlled companies performed extremely well, and far 
better than many comparable enterprises that remained controlled by the state or by their Soviet-
era managers.  
  Initially, the oligarchs faced formidable challenges—wrestling control from the existing 
management teams, cleaning out organized crime from the factories, dealing with the 
corporations’ massive debts, and consolidating ownership. The first priority of Khodorkovsky, 
Potanin, and Berezovsky was to increase their stakes in the companies and in their subsidiaries, 
and they pursued this end aggressively, breaking or at least bending the law where necessary. In 
some cases, the oligarchs diluted the ownership of minority shareholders through additional share 
issues. The tricks they used were not particularly original—they had been tried and tested in 
economically rising countries around the world, including in the US oil industry of the early 20
th 
Century, where business tactics included extortion, theft, and even murder (Landers 2000). Of 
course, their lack of originality does not make such practices any more defensible. 
                                                 
22 See Hoffman’s detailed account (2003, pp.372-96). 15 
 
After they had consolidated their ownership, the Russian tycoons ran their companies far 
better than they had been managed before the takeover. They were interested in attracting foreign 
investors and reselling stakes for a profit. To do this, they needed to restructure their companies, 
introduce international standards of accounting and disclosure, and appoint independent board 
members. Yukos and Sibneft brought in the oil service firms Schlumberger and Halliburton to 
help extract oil more efficiently. Khodorkovsky hired 20 executives from French, US, and other 
foreign firms (Landers 2000). Their output soared. Yukos under Khodorkovsky underwent a 
striking transformation from one of the most disreputable companies to a leader in transparency 
and corporate governance.  
  Between 1996 and 2001, reported pretax profits of Yukos, Sibneft and Norilsk Nickel 
rose by 36, 10, and 5 times respectively (this despite only a modest increase in the oil price from 
$21 to $24 a barrel).
23 By 2005, profits at Sibneft and Norilsk had grown another 55 and 96 
percent respectively (by that time Yukos had been dismembered by Putin’s tax collectors). 
Productivity—measured in dollars of revenue per worker—rose much faster in oligarch-owned 
oil companies than in similar state-owned enterprises or those still under Soviet era management, 
which also did better than the state-owned enterprises (see Figure 1). The stock prices of the 
privatized companies also exploded upwards. Between the end of 1996 and the end of 2003, 
Sibneft’s market capitalization increased by more than 10 times, and that of Yukos by more than 
50 times in dollar terms.
24 (During this period, the RTS market average increased by about three 
times.) Nor was it the case that the oligarchs had simply chosen for themselves the companies 
with the best prospects. As Figure 1 shows, productivity in the oligarchs’ oil companies when 
                                                 
23 Profits calculated from figures in Ekspert database, www.expert.ru/ratings/, deflating by the CPI; oil 
price is annual average price for Brent crude, from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009.  
 
24 Calculated from Ekspert databse, www.expert.ru/ratings/, which gives capitalization for Sibneft and 
Yukos respectively in 1996 as $1.29 bn and  $646 mn, and in 2003 as $13.2 bn and $32.8 bn.  
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they bought their stakes in 1996 was lower than that in either the largest state-owned companies 




Were the oligarchs stripping assets from the companies they controlled? They certainly 
reduced the value of the shares held by minority shareholders initially. After the 1998 crisis, they 
defaulted on loans to Western banks. But after the oligarchs consolidated control, their 
companies’ audited financial statements suggest that far from stripping assets, they were actively 
                                                 
25 A number of other studies have also found better performance in the oligarch-owned companies than in 
other Russian-owned companies (although those owned by foreign investors tend to do best of all). See 




































































investing, building plants, replacing equipment, and developing their property. Between 1998 and 
2003, annual “upstream” investment in the two oligarch-controlled oil companies Yukos and 
Sibneft increased by about 140 percent (see Table 2). In the first 10 months of 2003 (before the 
Kremlin’s assault), Yukos’ upstream investments came to $1.1 billion, substantially more than 
those of any other Russian oil company. By 2005, Norilsk Nickel was investing more than $700 
million a year. There is no evidence here that the oligarchs’ companies were increasing their 
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In fact, the most serious asset stripping scandals involved companies in which the state 
retained large stakes. In the 1990s, Gazprom’s management was accused of diverting assets into a 
                                                 
26 My point here is not that the oligarchs were investing more than the Soviet era managers of LUKoil and 
Surgutneftegaz; as Table 2 shows, they were also investing a lot.  18 
 
network of companies owned by the managers (Åslund, 2007, p.142). Assets of the state-owned 
airline Aeroflot fell between 1997 and 2002.
27 Indeed, it is striking how differently the oligarchs 
behaved in companies they owned and in those where they merely influenced the management 
(such as Aeroflot, where Berezovsky had partial control). The claim that they privatized firms in 
order to strip assets gets it backwards. They—along with the red directors—stripped assets from 
state-controlled companies in order to accumulate funds to buy shares when such enterprises 
were sold. The need to stop such theft was one of the main reasons to hasten privatization.  
 
 
6   How did the oligarchs’ control over major companies affect the Russian 
economy?  
Did the after-effects of loans for shares depress economic growth? In fact, the opposite is true. 
Russia’s rapid growth in the years from 1999 to 2004 was catalyzed by the extremely high growth 
of oil production in the oligarchs’ companies. Between 1999 and 2003, revenues of Yukos, 
Sibneft, and Norilsk Nickel grew much faster than GDP.
28 The output of oil and gas condensate 
of the companies sold to oligarchs in loans for shares (Yukos, Sibneft, Sidanco) rose by 62 
percent between 1999 and 2003; output of the two companies sold to red directors (LUKoil and 
Surgutneftegaz) rose in the same years by 46 percent; that of the three state-owned oil companies 
Rosneft, Tatneft, and Bashneft rose by just 15 percent (OECD 2004, p.85).  
Did loans for shares “impoverish” the population? It is hard to see how. The proportion 
of the population with incomes below the poverty line averaged 28 percent in the four years 
before loans for shares; in the four years after the program, the proportion averaged 24 percent. 
Since then, the poverty rate has fallen to 13 percent.
29 What about inequality? The wealth of 
                                                 
27 Data from Aeroflot’s annual financial statements.  
 
28 My calculations from the Ekspert database, www.expert.ru/ratings/.  
 
29 Goskomstat RF, Rossiysky statistichesky yezhegodnik, various years.   19 
 
Russian big businessmen did expand dramatically in the years after the loans for shares sales, and 
this must have exacerbated wealth inequality. However, this was true of both those who 
participated in loans for shares and the many more who did not. Fortunes were created by the rise 
in world commodity prices, the restructuring of Russian enterprises, and the consequent ascent of 
the Russian stock market. By 2008, there were 87 Russians on Forbes’ list of the world’s 1,125 
billionaires. Of these, only eight had anything to do with the loans for shares auctions.
30 In fact, 
only three of the seven original oligarchs that Berezovsky mentioned in his famous 1996 
Financial Times interview—in which he claimed that he and six other bankers together controlled 
half the Russian economy—won anything in loans for shares.
31 Two—Mikhail Fridman and Pyotr 
Aven—complained angrily about their exclusion. Even Berezovsky only got in at the last minute. 
The loans for shares winners were a small subset of Russia’s wealthy at the time, and an even 
smaller subset today.  
 
7   Conclusion 
In the loans for shares program of 1995-6, stakes in state-owned enterprises valued by the market  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
30 These were Boris Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich, David Davidovich (of Abramovich’s Millhouse), 
Vladimir Potanin, Potanin’s partner Mikhail Prokhorov, Vagit Alekperov and Leonid Fedun of LUKoil, 
and Vladimir Bogdanov of Surgutneftegaz. See http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/05/richest-people-
billionaires-billionaires08-cx_lk_0305billie_land.html. 
 
31 See Freeland et al. (1996). The seven bankers mentioned were Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (of 
Bank Menatep), Mikhail Fridman and Pyotr Aven (of Alfabank), Vladimir Gusinsky (of Most Bank), 
Aleksandr Smolensky (of Stolichny Bank), and Vladimir Potanin (of Oneksimbank). Berezovsky’s claim 
was demonstrable nonsense. Even if we assumed—wrongly—that they had full control already over the 
companies in which they were managing stakes under the loans for shares program, the total revenues of 
the seven tycoons’ main industrial properties in 1996 would come to about six percent of GDP (or 7.7 
percent of total value added of the non-state sector). This is the total for Norilsk Nickel, Novolipetsk Metal 
Works, Sidanko, Yukos, Sibneft, AvtoVAZ, Mechel, Apatit, and Aeroflot, calculated using the Ekspert 
database. Including the revenues of their banks, television companies, and shipping companies (for which 
figures were not available) would increase the total, but it is hard to imagine it would end up above 10 
percent of GDP. If we take into account that oil companies often engaged in transfer pricing, so that part of 
the value was realized by trade companies rather than the oil company itself, this could conceivably raise 
the oligarchs’ holdings to 15 percent of GDP. Still the 50 percent claim was widely repeated as if credible 
by both the tycoons’ promoters and their detractors. 
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at around $1.5-1.9 billion were sold to a mix of brash private entrepreneurs (“oligarchs”) and 
Soviet-era industrial managers (“red directors”) for about $850 million.
32 The details of the 
arrangement and the way the auctions were conducted suggested blatant cronyism. Although the 
discounts on market prices for the stakes sold to the red directors were unusually large, the 
discounts on the sales to the oligarchs were in the range customary for emerging market 
privatizations. The value of the stakes involved—amounting to less than 10 percent of total 
market capitalization at that time—was less than the market value of the shares in the single 
company Gazprom that were given away for free in return for privatization vouchers.  
  Those companies acquired by the oligarchs—after an initial period in which minority 
investors were squeezed out, often in disreputable ways—performed extremely well, reorganizing 
their operations and increasing productivity far faster than similar companies that remained state 
owned, and somewhat faster than those that were privatized to Soviet era managers. The 
oligarchs’ companies were the driving force behind the commodity boom of the early 2000s. 
Their very success made them attractive targets for takeovers—hostile or otherwise—by the new 
security service businessmen of President Putin’s entourage.  
  The Russian oligarchs were hardly a unique phenomenon. As La Porta et al have shown, 
concentrated ownership is common in most developing and many developed countries (La Porta 
et al., 1999). In Mexico, to take just one example, powerful families hold monopolies over the 
production of everything from cement to tortillas, and television is a duopoly of two competing 
tycoons (Coster 2007). Telecommunications is dominated by Carlos Slim Helú—for a while, the 
world’s richest man—whose career path surely rivals that of any Russian oligarch. In 1990, when 
Slim’s personal friend, Mexican President Carlos Salinas, privatized the national telephone 
company Teléfonos de México, or Telmex, Slim won, paying $1.76 billion, in an auction that the 
                                                 
32 To get the $850 mn figure, I have added the loan amounts for Mechel, Nafta Moskva, and  Murmansk, 
North-West and Novorossiysk Shipping to the total price received by the state for the other stakes, since I 
could find no information that the holders of the shares in these five companies had paid more than this in 
the subsequent auctions for the shares.  21 
 
loser claimed had been rigged.
33 In 2009, Telmex’s market capitalization was about $19 billion. 
That year, Slim’s companies controlled 92 percent of all the landline phones in Mexico and 73 
percent of all its cellphones (Luhnow 2007). When a rival took Telmex to court for monopolistic 
practices, Slim’s company got a judge to issue an arrest warrant for the rival’s top lawyer on 
trumped up charges, according to The Wall Street Journal. In 2000, President Vicente Fox 
appointed a former Telmex employee as his minister of communications (Luhnow 2007). Similar 
stories of rapid ascents to billionaire status, apparently facilitated by personal connections and 
controversial privatization deals, can be told about dozens of businessmen throughout Latin 
America and Asia.  
  If the facts as presented in this article are correct, why were the scale, significance, and 
negative impact of the loans for shares program so exaggerated by contemporary opinion-
makers? For different reasons, the mystique of the all-powerful oligarchs appealed to almost 
everyone (Treisman 2010). It paid off richly, first of all, for the oligarchs themselves. Besides 
gratifying their vanity, it attracted investment partners and won these recent outsiders, who a few 
years earlier had been driving cabs or selling automobile parts, the respect and assistance of lower 
level bureaucrats. Among many ordinary Russians, it resonated with the suspicion of wealth and 
enterprise engendered by decades of communist socialization. For the Communists, the image of 
a clique of super-capitalists—many of them Jewish—manipulating the president was almost too 
good to be true.
34 For Western journalists, the oligarch saga made for a simple story that could 
explain the corruption and chaos of Russian politics to readers in terms of a few vivid 
                                                 
33 Lacey (2009). Slim and Salinas both deny that there was anything untoward about the deal.  
 
34 Many of the top oligarchs had at least one Jewish parent. Casting a broader net, Sergey Braguinsky 
(2009) examined the backgrounds and history of 296 leading Russian business people from the period after 
1995. He found a clear division between one class of “insider” businessmen, who had been in high 
administrative posts or enterprise management before 1991, and the “outsiders,” who were “younger, had 
higher human capital (i.e. had higher degrees from elite universities or institutes), and were 
disproportionately of Jewish ethnicity.” 
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personalities. For reformers in the government such as Boris Nemtsov, the oligarchs became a 
convenient excuse for failure and a target against whom public anger could be deflected.    
  In fact, the biggest winners from loans for shares—as from most controversial policies in 
the 1990s—were not the upstart entrepreneurs but the aristocrats of the old Soviet order, who had 
occupied the commanding heights of industry as the ancien regime collapsed. Vagit Alekperov, 
the last acting Soviet oil minister, built the company LUKoil out of the country’s best oil fields 
and refineries, and then left government to become its president. In the course of privatization, 
LUKoil’s managers and employees obtained a major stake in the company—at least 36 percent as 
of 1996, by one estimate—only one seventh of this via loans for shares (Lane 1999, p.28). By 
2004, Alekperov had personally acquired 10.4 percent of the shares, which by 2008 would be 
worth $6.7 billion.
35 Vladimir Bogdanov was the director of the oil company Surgutneftegaz in 
the late 1980s when reforms began. He shepherded the firm through privatization, using the 
company’s pension fund to buy 40 percent of the shares in loans for shares, at a very large 
discount on the market price. By 2008, Bogdanov’s personal wealth was estimated by Forbes at 
$2.6 billion.
36  
  The red directors did not need loans for shares to achieve their objectives. In fact, they 
could usually entrench themselves even more effectively using the worker buyouts and voucher 
auctions of the mass privatization program. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the last Soviet gas minister, 
packed together the plants, refineries, and pipelines of the Soviet gas industry into the enormous, 
monopolistic concern, Gazprom. Later, as prime minister, he oversaw the company’s 
privatization, in which almost 60 percent was given away for vouchers, much of it to the 
company’s managers and employees. Rem Vyakhirev, Chernomyrdin’s successor as Gazprom 
                                                 
35 See Maass (2004). LUKoil’s market capitalization was $64.4 billion in 2008 (Ekspert database, 
www.expert.ru/ratings/).  
 




CEO, persuaded the government under prime minister Chernomyrdin to let him manage the 
remaining state-owned shares under a controversial trust arrangement. To prevent his ouster, he 
had set up the rules so that the company’s CEO could not be replaced without the unanimous 
agreement of the Board of Directors—a body that included himself (Panyushkin and Zygar 2008, 
p.105). By 2008, the company was the world’s fifth most highly valued, with a capitalization of 
$307 billion.
37 Oleg Soskovets, the general director of the Karaganda Metals Factory in 
Kazakhstan, and then the last Soviet minister of metallurgy, served as Russia’s first vice premier 
from 1993 to 1996. His deputy at the Karaganda Factory, Vladimir Lisin, ended up one of 
Russia’s leading steel magnates, with an estimated personal fortune in 2008 of $24 billion.
38  
  Some of the red directors undoubtedly transformed themselves into effective, modern 
managers, able to operate competently in a market environment. However, especially in the early 
years, their success had more to do with insider status. Their impact on the government’s 
economic policy was incomparably greater than that of the oligarchs. It was thanks to their 
lobbying that oil and gas prices were not liberalized for years in the early 1990s, creating billions 
of dollars of arbitrage profits for those in control of the plants. Soskovets obtained tax exemptions 
for the metals industry that, according to Anders Åslund, were worth about two percent of GDP 
(Åslund 2007, p.138). By contrast, the three years after loans for shares saw the oligarchs 
repeatedly thwarted in their designs and subjected to intensifying pressure to pay their 
companies’ tax debts.
39 
                                                 
37 See Forbes, www.forbes.com/lists/2008/18/biz_2000global08_The-Global-2000_MktVal.html.  
 
38 The estimate is that of Forbes, as reported in “$1 billion not enough for Forbes’ 100,” The Moscow 
Times, April 21, 2008.  
 
39 Three did, at one point or other, serve as executive branch officials. In 1992, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was 
an advisor to the Russian energy minister. For about six months in 1996-7, Vladimir Potanin served as 
deputy prime minister. Boris Berezovsky also served for about a year as deputy secretary of the Security 
Council. These jobs gave them the opportunity to lobby from inside the tent rather than from outside, and 
to meddle in personnel matters. However, I am not aware of any decisions that were made under their 
influence while they were in government that the Prime Minister or President was not inclined to make 
anyway. In fact, the oligarchs lost almost all the main fights they were involved in during this period (see 
Treisman 2010).  24 
 
  The loans for shares scheme was a public relations disaster. It did not by itself discredit 
privatization with the Russian public. Surveys show that privatization is unpopular in all the 
postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe, and less unpopular in Russia than in some others 
such as Hungary that had relatively uncontroversial privatizations.
40 But the negative image of the 
program became a resource for populists to exploit. It remains valuable to those in Russia who 
wish to improve perceptions of the current regime by contrasting it with the perceived corruption 
of the Yeltsin administration.  
  
                                                 
40 Denisova and colleagues (2007) surveyed the populations of 28 countries and found that on average only 
19 percent thought that privatized companies should be left in the hands of their current owners without any 
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